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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CONTROLLING MEDICARE COSTS: MOVING BEYOND INEPT
ADMINISTERED PRICING AND ERSATZ COMPETITION
THOMAS L. GREANEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Medicare has been at the epicenter of deficit reduction and health
reform discussions for many years. Controlling Medicare spending figured
prominently in the government “shutdown” and President Clinton’s veto of a
Medicare voucher plan in 1995,1 the ill-fated “grand bargain” discussed
during the debt extension crisis of 2011,2 the debate over enactment of the
Affordable Care Act (ACA),3 and most recently negotiations about avoiding
the “fiscal cliff.”4 This debate, to the extent it can be labeled as such, has
been vacuous. Much has focused on whether premium support plans will
deprive seniors of choice and financial security in their healthcare decisions.
Other reform proposals, such as raising the eligibility age for Medicare
beneficiaries, restricting Medigap coverage, and indiscriminately reducing
provider reimbursement, are questionable from a deficit-reduction
standpoint and detrimental in their collateral effects on access and equity.
Missing from the discussion has been a serious treatment of how and how
much providers should be paid. (Yes, “paid,” not “reimbursed;” the
unspoken and politically discomforting fact is that “cost control” necessarily
spells lower incomes for many in the healthcare sector.) Proponents and
opponents of market-based reform consistently fail to acknowledge the
prerequisites of reducing the price and volume of services through private
bargaining between payers (government or commercial) and providers and
sellers of medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and supplies. Likewise, those
* Chester A. Myers Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint
Louis University School of Law.
1. Jonathan Oberlander, The Politics of Medicare Reform, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1095,
1120 (2003).
2. Jeanne Sahadi, Debt Ceiling: Perils of a ‘Grand Bargain’, CNNMONEY (July 8,
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/08/news/economy/debt_ceiling/index.html.
3. Robert A. Berenson, Implementing Health Care Reform – Why Medicare Matters, 363
NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (2010).
4. Josh Boak, Medicare May Be a Silent Killer in Budget Battles, FISCAL TIMES (Dec. 20,
2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/12/20/Medicare-May-Be-the-Silent-Kill
er-in-Budget-Battles.aspx#page1.
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who support retaining traditional Medicare tend to ignore the grievous flaws
of administered pricing and the government’s repeatedly unsuccessful
attempts at reform.
This essay seeks to refocus the discussion. Acknowledging that
controlling Medicare spending is an important national priority, it deals with
the core problem of rationalizing cost in a market-based system. Part II
critiques the premium support proposal that figured prominently in the 2012
Presidential campaign, revealing the flawed assumptions that undermine
reliance on purported market efficiency. Part III looks at the bête noire of
provider payment under Medicare, fee-for-service (FFS) methodology, and
the ineffective governmental efforts at administered pricing. The article next
reviews the flaws in the design and administration of the managed care
options offered to Medicare beneficiaries. Finally, it concludes by discussing
the reforms embodied in the ACA, finding a ray of hope in its efforts to
adjust provider payments in a way that potentially will transform healthcare
delivery.
II. PREMIUM SUPPORT
2012 was a year in which Medicare dominated political and legislative
discourse as never before. Concerns over the fiscal threat posed by growing
expenditures and rising eligibility for the Medicare program focused national
attention on proposals to “reform” Medicare. Although just two years earlier
Congress had debated and ultimately made important changes to the
program in enacting the ACA, the 2012 Presidential campaign brought the
issue of cost control into sharp relief. For the most part, the debate centered
on the “premium support” proposal advanced by Vice Presidential
candidate Paul Ryan, a reform that had twice passed the House of
Representatives5 and had been advanced for a number of years by groups
examining ways to deal with the nation’s budgetary problems.6

5. In 2011 and 2012, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2 and H.R. 6079
respectively, which would adopt premium support for Medicare and repeal the ACA. Letter
from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to John Boehner, Speaker, U.S.
House of Rep. (July 24, 2012). Neither bill was acted upon by the Senate. For a list of other
legislative proposals, see KAISER FAMILY FOUND., COMPARISON OF MEDICARE PREMIUM SUPPORT
PROPOSALS (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8284.pdf.
6. The National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility, often referred to as the Simpson
Bowles Commission from the names of its chairmen, Alan Simpson and Erskine Bowles, had
proposed deficit reductions from Medicare by reforming the Sustainable Growth Rate
mechanism, increasing cost sharing, restricting first dollar coverage in Medigap plans, and
reducing provider payments. See NATIONAL COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM,
THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 35-45 (2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fis
calcommission.gov/files/documents/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf. The Bipartisan Policy
Center’s Debt Reduction Task Force, chaired by Senator Pete Dominici and Dr. Alice Rivlin,
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The broad outlines of the premium support are as follows.7 It would
replace Medicare’s guarantee to pay for all defined medical benefits.
Instead, beneficiaries would receive a fixed allowance (“voucher” for those
less sympathetic to the concept) that would be used to purchase a health
plan from commercial insurers. Vouchers would vary by age, health status,
and, to some not specified extent, by the income of the recipient.
Controversially, increases in the voucher would be pegged to increases in
the GDP, not medical expense inflation. Medicare beneficiaries would shop
on a new Medicare exchange, presumably a virtual marketplace akin to the
exchanges that the ACA establishes for private insurance (notwithstanding
the fact that the Romney-Ryan agenda promised repeal of that legislation8).
As outlined in the latest iteration, the Ryan proposal contained an important
change for traditional, FFS Medicare. Private plans would not only compete
with each other under a bidding system, but also will in some sense
“compete” with traditional FFS Medicare. Because there is no traditional FFS
entity that could submit a “bid,” the proposal presumably contemplated that
the overall provider rates in each region would be reduced to the extent that
the costs of traditional Medicare exceed the bids of the second lowest bid
among private plans.
At the heart of Congressman Ryan’s plan is a fairly straightforward
proposition. By exercising their judgment as consumers — choosing private
health plans and shopping for cost-effective high quality providers in their
plans — Medicare beneficiaries can curb overuse of care, spur improve-

proposed substantial increases in Medicare Part B premiums and cost sharing, and converting
Medicare into a premium support system. BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., RESTORING AMERICA’S FUTURE
17 (2010), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/bpc%20final%20report%
20for%20printer%2002%2028%2011.pdf.
7. The original legislative agenda put forth by Congressman Ryan, labeled “A Roadmap
For America’s Future,” proposed to repeal most of the central features of the ACA, including
subsidies for insurance purchases, insurance exchanges, and requirements that businesses
provide insurance and that individuals buy it. See PAUL RYAN, A ROAD MAP FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE
(2010), available at http://roadmap.republicans.budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/roadmap2
final2.pdf. Congressman Ryan amended his plan somewhat early in December 2011, when he
introduced a “framework” for Medicare reform co-sponsored by Democratic Senator Ron
Wyden. Unlike the voucher program contained in the original Ryan plan, which gave seniors a
fixed amount of money to purchase health plans, the Wyden-Ryan plan would adjust premium
support payments each year to reflect the actual cost of health insurance premiums. See RON
WYDEN & PAUL RYAN, GUARANTEED CHOICES TO STRENGTHEN MEDICARE AND HEALTH SECURITY
FOR ALL: BIPARTISAN OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE (2011), available at http://www.wyden.senate.
gov/imo/media/doc/wyden-ryan.pdf.
8. Timothy Jost, Dismantling the Affordable Care Act: What Could A President Romney
and Hill Republicans Do?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 20, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2012/09/20/dismantling-the-affordable-care-act-what-could-a-president-romney-and-hillrepublicans-do/.
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ments in the delivery of healthcare, and ultimately lower the cost of the
program. Less widely noted is a necessary corollary of the Ryan plan: If the
behavior of Medicare beneficiaries is not successful in lowering costs,
medical inflation will be largely shifted to them. Looked at from this
perspective it should be evident that the Ryan plan privatizes enormous
financial risk, and the bearer of that new burden is a large and vulnerable
sector of society. While the proposal raises abundant concerns based on
notions of equity and the implicit social contract of the Medicare program,
the following analysis focuses on several questionable behavioral and
economic assumptions that underlie the proposal.
First, consider placing responsibility on the Medicare beneficiary for
driving the health system change by her decisions as a consumer. She will
do this at two junctures under a market-driven Medicare system. First, in
choosing among plans, she will seek out the plan with the best network of
providers, premium and co-payment responsibilities, and reputation for
quality. Second, she will exercise her discretion at the point of service, that
is, when she decides whether to seek medical care and from what type and
what particular provider. Co-payments and deductibles are the standard
means by which insurers encourage consumers to have an economic stake
in the purchase of services (“skin in the game” is the unfortunate
watchword). The assumption of premium support advocates is that seniors
will pick plans with higher cost sharing requirements and also will be
incentivized to shop more prudently for lower priced providers. Further, a
fair assumption is that under premium support, private plans will follow what
is becoming common practice in the commercial market: encouraging
comparative shopping at the point of service by offering different co-pay
responsibilities for providers grouped in different “tiers” and by requiring copayments that will discourage overuse.
However, as the following table indicates,9 the typical Medicare
beneficiary will make this choice under a variety of constraints. The chances
are about 50/50 that she has income under $50,000, less than $53,000 in
savings, and three or more chronic conditions. The probability is also that
she has some cognitive or physical impairment and that she sees four or
more different physicians. This data raises serious questions as to whether
many beneficiaries will be well-positioned to make sound comparative
judgments or to have a sufficient reservoir of resources to bear substantial
co-payments based solely on the expected health benefits from treatment.

9. KAREN DAVIS, COMMONWEALTH FUND., THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE: CONVERTING TO
PREMIUM SUPPORT OR CONTINUING AS A GUARANTEED BENEFIT PROGRAM 22 (2012), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Testimony/2012/Oct/Davis_
HouseDems_Medicare_testimony_10022012_FINAL.pdf.
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Characteristics of Medicare Beneficiaries
percent of Medicare population

Per Capita Annual Income
Below $22,000

50%

Per Capita Savings Below
$53,000

50%

3 or More Chronic
Conditions

45%

Cognitive/Mental
Impairment

29%

Multiple Physicians
2 or More ADL Limitations
Age 85+

20%
15%
12%

Note also the highly skewed distribution of Medicare costs: 77% of all
Medicare program expenditures are spent on 19.4% of beneficiaries while
69% of all beneficiaries spent less than $5,000 per year on out-of-pocket
costs.10 This fact has profound implications for both the effectiveness and
equity of premium support. First consider the incentives facing beneficiaries
with multiple chronic conditions. Proponents of premium support promise to
place stop loss caps on beneficiaries’ financial responsibilities at levels
around $6,000 per year. Consequently, beneficiaries with serious illnesses
or chronic diseases would be likely to exceed cost sharing caps quickly and
thus be relatively immune to cost sharing incentives.11 Further, the overall
impact of these incentives is questionable. If those with less than $10,000 in
costs reduce their spending by 20% — a very significant and probably
unrealistic reduction — the total reduction to Medicare costs would only be
5%.12 Second, the impact of premium support would be highly
discriminatory; geographic variation in Medicare costs would produce
significant variations in the burden borne by seniors in different regions. The
Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that half of current FFS beneficiaries and

10. ROBERT A. BERENSON & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST., PRESERVING MEDICARE: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CONTROLLING SPENDING 4-5 (2011), available at http://www.urban.
org/uploadedpdf/412405-Preserving-Medicare-A-Practical-Approach-to-ControllingSpending.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5.
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most beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans would pay more
under the Ryan premium support plan if implemented today and that there
would be tremendous regional variations in costs.13 Finally, recent research
concerning how Medicare beneficiaries comparative shop for managed
care services adds additional grounds for questioning the efficacy of
premium support. For example, a study by Heiss et al. finds that fewer than
10% of Medicare beneficiaries enroll in the Part D pharmacy plan that
would be the most cost-effective plan for them.14 Using data on plan choice,
drug use, health conditions, out of pocket costs, and premiums, the authors
found enrollees lose an average of about $300 per year. The study also
suggests that seniors pay more attention to premiums than plan generosity,
thus miscalculating the ultimate cost they would bear.15 Other studies show
that seniors rarely shift once they have chosen a plan; they are only half as
likely to change MA plans as federal employees.16
A second ground for skepticism about the efficacy of premium support
proposals is based on what we know about healthcare provider markets.
Inasmuch as the premium support model depends on competitive provider
markets to promote cost efficiency, much depends on the vigor of market
competition. A large body of literature documents the existence, scope, and
effects of market concentration. Meta-analysis by Vogt and Town
demonstrates a strong correlation between hospital market concentration
and escalating costs of health insurance: hospital consolidation in the
1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at least 5%, and by 40% or more
when merging hospitals were located close to one another.17 An important
study undertaken by the Massachusetts Attorney General documents the
effects of provider leverage on healthcare costs and insurance premiums,18
notably finding prices for health services are uncorrelated with quality,
complexity, proportion of government patients, or academic status, but
13. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., TRANSFORMING MEDICARE INTO A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM:
IMPLICATIONS FOR BENEFICIARY PREMIUMS 20-24 (2012).
14. Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative
Data 25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18166, 2012).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Chao Zhou et al., The Vast Majority of Medicare Part D Beneficiaries Still
Don’t Choose the Cheapest Plans that Meet their Medication Needs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2259,
2263 (2012); Zirui Song et al., Potential Consequences of Reforming Medicare Into a
Competitive Bidding System, 308 JAMA 459, 460 (2012).
17. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 4 (2006),
available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/no9researchreport.pdf.
18. MA. ATTORNEY GENERAL, EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST
DRIVERS PURSUANT TO G.L. C. 118G, § 6½(b) (2010) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS],
available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/final-report-w-cover-appendices-glos
sary.pdf.
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instead are positively correlated with provider market power.19 It concludes
that the single most important cause of price escalation was “provider
leverage.”20 Another report, drawing on site visits by the Center for Studying
Health System Change to six California markets in 2008, found that
provider leverage has had a major impact on California premium trends.21
Private plans will inevitably face essentially the same difficulty in negotiating
with entrenched, “must have” providers.
In sum, the bottom line for Ryan’s premium support plan is that (1)
commercial payers will lack power to effectively bargain with providers
whose costs drive the healthcare inflationary spiral and (2) seniors, as
consumers, will exert only weak pressure on the demand side. Are there
viable alternative strategies? Provider payment and beneficiary incentives
are the key to controlling costs, whether we are in a market-driven system,
the traditional FFS Medicare payment methodology, or some mix of the two.
The following sections review the leading alternatives for successfully
constraining these costs.
III. CONTROLLING FEE-FOR-SERVICE PAYMENTS
Over its nearly 50 year history, Medicare has been subject to a series of
adjustments that attempt to deal with the serious deficiencies inherent in FFS
payment. Paying physicians, and in some cases facilities, based on each
procedure they perform is the bête noire of the system.22 By rewarding
providers for the volume of service without regard to quality or outcomes,
FFS payment skews incentives and inexorably raises costs. While Medicare
does pay hospitals prospectively based on DRG bundles for hospitalization,
e.g., hip replacement or craniotomy, that methodology also fails to cover
entire episodes of care or bundle physician care and other services. Further,
prospective payment does not reward or penalize providers based on quality
or outcomes. Indeed, the empirical evidence suggests that Medicare
geographic areas with higher volume do not have better outcomes.23
Some of the changes in Medicare payment over the years that sought to
redirect incentives, such as the shift to prospective payment for hospitals
19. Id. at 16-33.
20. Id. at 28.
21. Robert Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 704 (2010).
22. Reforming the Health Care Delivery System: Hearing before the Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 109th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Glenn B. Hackbarth, Chairman, MedPAC)
[hereinafter Hackbarth statement]; see generally Harold Miller, From Volume to Value: Better
Ways to Pay for Health Care, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1418 (2009) (suggesting that barriers that
prevent Medicare from improving quality and controlling costs stem from the fee-for-service
payment system).
23. Hackbarth statement, supra note 22, at 5.
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under the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), have been
moderately successful.24 Paying one price for a defined bundle of services
provided per hospital admission lowered hospital costs by reducing lengths
of stay and encouraging to some extent conservation of health resources.25
However, IPPS has necessitated close regulatory supervision and reform to
deal with problems associated with a host of complexities including
adjustments to account for wage differentials, new technology, case severity
differences, upcoding by providers, and a variety of other factors.26
Moreover, enthusiasm based on the IPPS success story should be tempered
by considering the larger picture. As discussed infra, there is some evidence
that Medicare hospital payments induce cost-shifting to private payers,
although the degree and direction of shifting depends on the balance of
market power between hospitals and health plans.27 In addition, IPPS adds
enormous administrative complexity to what is ultimately a process for
setting a global budget. Further, it does so without adjusting for quality or
outcomes among hospitals, paying the best and worst hospitals the same
base payment regardless of performance (leading one former CMS
administrator to call his agency a “big dumb price fixer”28).
Other reforms such as paying physicians using the Resource Based
Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) have been notorious failures because of
inadequate controls over the volume of services and the disparity in payment
between specialty and primary care services. The Medicare Physician Fee
Schedule — which employs the RBRVS methodology adopted under the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 — put in place a scale for
differentiating the levels of payments to physicians under Medicare based on

24. Id. at 12-13.
25. See Stuart Altman, The Lessons of Medicare’s Prospective Payment System Show That
the Bundled Payment Program Faces Challenges, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1923, 1928 (2012).
26. See id. at 1927 (explaining DRG system failure to reflect severity of illness resulting in
overpayments and underpayments and necessitating increase from 538 DRGs to nearly 1000
groupings); David Frankford, The Complexity of Medicare’s Hospital Reimbursement System:
Paradoxes of Averaging, 78 IOWA L. REV. 517, 577-78 (1993); see MEDICARE PAYMENT
ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: PROMOTING GREATER EFFICIENCY IN MEDICARE 36
(2007), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Jun07_entirereport.pdf;
see generally CCH, 2011 MEDICARE EXPLAINED (Pam Carron et al. eds., 2011).
27. See Austin B. Frakt, How Much Do Hospitals Cost-Shift? A Review of the Evidence, 89
MILBANK Q. 90 (2011); Allen Dobson et al., The Cost-Shift Payment ‘Hydraulic’: Foundation,
History, and Implication, 25 HEALTH AFF. 22, 27 (2006); Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Many Prices
Paid to Providers and the Flawed Theory of Cost Shifting: Is It Time For a More Radical AllPayer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2127 (2011).
28. Uwe Reinhardt, The Medicare World From Both Sides: A Conversation with Tom
Scully, 22 HEALTH AFF. 167, 168 (2003).
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the complexity, costs, and other factors for each procedure.29 It was left to
Congress to update the multiplier (conversion factor) for these value scales
to determine what physicians would be paid. Congress came up with an
astonishingly naïve mechanism, the Volume Performance Standard (VPS), to
control the volume or intensity of services provided. As originally designed,
the VPS sought to discourage physicians from overusing services by reducing
per service payment levels if overall volume increases exceeded a specified
threshold.30 This approach ignored the patent collective action problem:
there was simply no reason for an individual physician to reduce the volume
of services based on a net reduction in per service payment levels nationally
or even regionally.31
A few years later, CMS upped the ante by adopting the Sustainable
Growth Rate (SGR) formula which imposes cumulative forced reductions in
physician payments when total physician spending exceeds a fixed spending
amount.32 That is, if the total spending on physician services in a given year
exceeds an aggregate target based on the GDP and other factors, the
formula requires recouping that excess spending by reducing fee levels the
next year. Besides ignoring the collective action problem, the SGR process
was doubly naïve in failing to anticipate Congress’s response to proposed
reductions in physician incomes resulting from the process. In each year
since 2001 except one, Congress has passed legislation that overrode fee
reductions, with the result that as of 2012, absent another override,
physician fees would decline by 29.5%.33 Another critical flaw of Medicare
physician payment has been its failure to satisfy the central goal of the
RBRVS experiment: rationalizing payment to reward cognitive services and
reducing overpayments to procedure-oriented practices. Owing to its
reliance on the American Medical Association’s Relative Value Update

29. BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ASS’N, RESOURCE BASED RELATIVE VALUE SCALE 1-2 (2009),
available at https://www.bcbsal.org/providers/newpaymentmethodology/RBRVSEducation.pdf.
30. Physician Payments: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm on
Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 11 (2002) (statement of Dan L. Crippen, Dir., Cong. Budget
Office).
31. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ASSESSING
ALTERNATIVES TO THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE SYSTEM 205 (2007), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar07_SGR_mandated_report.pdf.
32. Id. at 11-12.
33. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE AND THE
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 7 (2011), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/jun
11_entirereport.pdf.
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Committee, which is dominated by specialists, the process continues to
over-weigh specialty procedures and undervalue primary care.34
As the foregoing account suggests, FFS Medicare regulation has been
mired in increasing administrative complexity and payment reform has failed
to accomplish many of its key objectives. Perhaps the most damning
criticism of FFS payment is that it has perpetuated a fragmented delivery
system by incentivizing procedure-oriented medical practices and failing to
reward outcomes or encourage integration.35 Moreover, Medicareadministered pricing may play a less important role in inducing overall cost
control than competition in commercial markets. Although administered
pricing under Medicare does not differentiate among providers based on
their market leverage, provider market competition has a significant effect
on hospital Medicare margins. Examining the effect of hospital market
concentration on Medicare payments, the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) has found that high hospital margins on privatepayer patients tend to induce more construction and higher hospital costs
and that, “when non-Medicare margins are high, hospitals face less
pressure to constrain costs, [and] costs rise.”36 These factors, MedPAC
observes, explain the counterintuitive phenomenon that hospital Medicare
margins tend to be low in markets in which hospital market concentration is
highest, while margins are higher in more competitively structured markets.37
Given the government’s spotty experience with administered pricing,
much attention has been paid to the market-based alternatives. The
following section analyzes the performance of Medicare managed care,
known as Medicare Advantage in its current incarnation.
IV. MEDICARE ADVANTAGE
Medicare beneficiaries have had the option of enrolling in private
HMOs since the 1970s.38 With the Balanced Budget Act of 199739 and the

34. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY 133-150 (2006), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/Mar06_entirere
port.pdf.
35. See generally THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE US HEALTHCARE SYSTEM: CAUSES AND
SOLUTIONS (Einer R. Elhauge ed., 2010).
36. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ASSESSING
ALTERNATIVES TO THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE SYSTEM xiv (2009), available at
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/mar09_entirereport.pdf.
37. Id.; see also Stensland et al., Private-Payer Profits Can Induce Negative Medicare
Margins, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1045, 1048-49 (2010).
38. See Robert A. Berenson & Bryan E. Dowd, Medicare Advantage Plans at a Crossroads
– Yet Again, 28 HEALTH AFF. w29, w30 (2008).
39. Id. at w32.
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Medicare Modernization Act of 2004,40 Congress successively renamed this
option and added incentives to enhance its attractiveness to beneficiaries.
As of the end of 2012, 27% of all Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in the
program now called Medicare Advantage (MA).41 With HMOs constituting
65% of MA enrollment and PPOs representing the balance of the
remainder, MA plans actively manage provider networks with programs
designed to assure the delivery of Part A and B services while avoiding
excess utilization. Operating under the budget constraint of capitated
payments, these plans have incentives to integrate care and subject
participating providers to financial incentives and other controls to achieve
desired outcomes.
The experience with MA plans is a cautionary tale illustrating the
problems of administering a program that is neither fish nor fowl. As
discussed below, although built around a bidding model, MA falls short of
replicating a competitive market outcome. While many MA plans have
proved highly successful at delivering integrated care below FFS costs with
equal or better quality measures42 and have demonstrated the capacity to
avoid readmissions and other cost drivers endemic in FFS Medicare,43 the
regulatory design of benchmark bidding and several politicized regulatory
adjustments have prevented the emergence of a fully cost-effective
alternative.
As originally implemented, Medicare set payment rates for managed
care at 95% of county-level FFS costs. The underlying policy concept was
that private plans that were more efficient and innovative than traditional
Medicare should be able to deliver care more cost efficiently, whose savings
could be shared with beneficiaries in the form of added benefits or reduced
premiums. It did not work out that way. Under an earlier incarnation,
awkwardly named Medicare + Choice, HMOs failed to deliver on promises
of expanded choice and superior quality.44 Flawed risk adjustment policies

40. Id. at w32-w33.
41. MARSHA GOLD ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE 2012 DATA
SPOTLIGHT: ENROLLMENT MARKET UPDATE 1 (2012), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/
upload/8323.pdf. Some states have substantially higher enrollments. Id. at 5 (Minnesota 46%,
Oregon 41%, Pennsylvania 38% California 36%).
42. Bruce E. Landon et al., Analysis of Medicare Advantage HMOs Compared with
Traditional Medicare Shows Lower Use of Many Services During 2003-2009, 31 HEALTH AFF.
2609, 2609 (2012).
43. Marsha Gold, Medicare Advantage – Lessons for Medicare’s Future, 366 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 1174, 1175 (2012); Jeff Lumieux et al., Hospital Readmission Rates in Medicare
Advantage Plans, 18 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 96, 103 (2012).
44. Marsha Gold, Medicare+Choice: An Interim Report Card, HEALTH AFF. , July 2001, at
120, 126 (cataloguing shortcomings of program following passage of the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997).
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allowed plans to earn more than the 95% standard because of their ability
to obtain healthier than average beneficiary cohorts.45 However
Congressional reaction under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which
caused Medicare growth to slow, caused many plans to withdraw from
Medicare or abandon less profitable geographic areas.46 In 2004,
Congress overreacted again — this time in the opposite direction — when it
adopted the Medicare Modernization Act.47 Renaming the program
“Medicare Advantage,” the Act added regional PPOs and private FFS plans
to expand the availability of MA plans to previously unserved or underserved
areas,48 and adopted bidding and risk sharing regulations, all with a
straightforward goal: promote MA enrollment by overpaying private plans.
The changes achieved that goal: by 2009, MA plans were receiving
payments in excess of 114% of FFS and some of the newly-configured MA
plans were not even designed to provide integrated care.49
Now this was all wrong for the self-evident reason that overpayments to
HMOs do not accomplish the goal of saving money. But in addition,
overpayments suffer from a dynamic flaw: they undermine incentives to
innovate and provide care more efficiently.50 The only rationale that can be
ascribed to Congress is the desire to turbo-charge HMO enrollments, or to
put it bluntly, to undermine traditional Medicare. (After all, it was Newt
Gingrich who acknowledged that a central aim of his voucher plan was to
make traditional Medicare unattractive so that it would “wither on the
vine.”51). Another lesson can be gleaned from understanding the historical
context: MA plans are not inherently more expensive than FFS Medicare but
are the inexorable product of administratively set, high benchmarks. As one
commentary aptly put it, “We pay these plans more because we choose to
do so.”52
45. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT
POLICY (2002), available at http://medpac.gov/documents/Mar11_EntireReport.pdf.
46. BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE IN THE ERA OF
HEALTH REFORM: PROGRESS IN LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD 1 (2011), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Issue-Briefs/2011/Mar/MedicareAdvantage.aspx.
47. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
48. See Marsha Gold, Medicare’s Private Plans: A Report Card on Medicare Advantage,
28 HEALTH AFF. W41, W42 (2008). By 2008 all Medicare beneficiaries had multiple MA
choices. Id.
49. See BILES, supra note 46, at 5.
50. Id. at 2.
51. POLITICS; Gingrich on Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 1996), http://www.nytimes.
com/1996/07/20/us/politics-gingrich-on-medicare.html.
52. Jeet S. Guram & Robert E. Moffit, The Medicare Advantage Success Story – Looking
Beyond the Cost Difference, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1177, 1178 (2012).
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Seeking to return to the concept of creating a level playing field between
traditional Medicare and MA plans, the ACA cut back substantially —
though not completely — on overpayments to MA plans. MA plans will be
paid based on current payments relative to FFS payments in those counties.
The highest paid counties will have benchmarks at 95% of FFS and the
lowest at 115%, with the others in between, so that by 2017, CMS will set
payments at a national average of 101% of FFS costs.53 In addition, plans
that perform well on quality scores can offset some of the reduction with
additional bonus payments for quality under the Star Rating program
initiated under the ACA.54 Yet all is not perfect with this reform. CMS
exercised its authority to establish a demonstration program allowing
bonuses to be paid to MA plans that performed below the ACA standard of
four stars or higher.55 This Lake Wobegone56 scoring system allowed 91% of
plans to get bonuses,57 which essentially gives back about half of the
projected savings from cuts to MA.58
A closer look at the MA bidding system suggests that even with the ACA
amendments, the process still falls short of replicating a competitive market.
Under the current bidding system, payments to MA plans are determined by
comparing each plan’s bid (which reflects the plan’s estimated costs) to a
benchmark. Plans bidding below the benchmark receive their bid plus a
"rebate" equal to 75% of the difference between the bid and the benchmark.
Those bidding above the benchmark — a rare occurrence — receive the
benchmark but must require that each plan enrollee pay a premium equal to
the difference between the bid and the benchmark. The ACA adjusted the
bidding framework by gradually lowering plan benchmarks to levels closer to
the cost of enrollees in traditional Medicare in each county, setting relatively

53. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, U.S. House of Rep. (Mar. 20, 2010).
54. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET 3-10 (2010), available at
http://www.cms.gov/apps/docs/Fact-Sheet-2011-Landscape-for-MAe-and-Part-D-FINAL1110
10.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Jonathan Becher, Lake Wobegon Effect, FORBES (May 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/sap/2012/05/21/lake-woebegone-effect/.
57. Gretchen Jacobson et al., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE ADVANTAGE STAR RATING
AND BONUS PAYMENTS IN 2012, at 5 (2011), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/
8257.pdf. Overall, however, the Star Rating System has produced some improvements in
quality. See Paul Cotton et al., Early Evidence Suggests Medicare Advantage Pay for
Performance May be Getting Results, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2012), http://healthaffairs.
org/blog/2012/10/29/early-evidence-suggests-medicare-advantage-pay-for-performancemay-be-getting-results/.
58. JAMES COSGROVE & EDDA EMMANUELLI-PEREZ, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-12-964T, MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: QUALITY BONUS PAYMENT DEMONSTRATION HAS DESIGN
FLAWS AND RAISES LEGAL CONCERNS 4 (2012).
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lower benchmarks in counties with high FFS Medicare costs, and relatively
higher benchmarks in counties with lower FFS costs.59
Though an improvement over its predecessor, this bidding process falls
short of creating effective incentives to lower costs. A central flaw is that
benchmarks continue to be based in part on historic private plan payment
rates and are subject to annual increases based on the growth in Medicare
spending.60 By retaining bidding against a preset benchmark, the bidding
process does not fully encourage plans to compete as strongly as one in
which payments are based on the average of plans’ bids. The resulting
misplaced economic incentives from retaining the linkage between payments
to MA plans and spending on FFS Medicare ultimately reduce the potential
savings that can be realized when private plans achieve lower costs than FFS
Medicare.61 Notably the Senate version of the ACA contained a provision
which was removed in the reconciliation process at the eleventh hour that
would have required competitive bidding that set payments based on the
average bid.62
This was not the first time that Congress proved unwilling to adopt a full
competitive bidding process for Medicare. In the 1990s, the predecessor
agency to CMS was rebuffed by opposition in Congress in its attempt to
establish a demonstration project for private plan competition in Baltimore,
Maryland and in Denver, Colorado.63 Prior to enactment of the ACA, the
Obama Administration had embraced a plan to “‘allow the market, not
Medicare, to set [Medicare Advantage] payment rates’” by eliminating
benchmarks based on FFS costs and instead requiring plans submitting bids
above regional average bids make up the difference between the average

59. Under the revised bidding formula benchmarks will be 95% of fee-for-service costs per
enrollee for the counties in the top quartile of fee-for-service costs; 100% for countries in the
second highest quartile; 107.5% for the third highest quartile and 115% for the bottom quartile.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3201, 24 Stat. 119, 442
(2010) (codified as amended in § 42 U.S.C. 1395w-23(j)(2011)) [hereinafter ACA].
60. See Robert A. Berenson, From Politics to Policy: A New Payment Approach in Medicare
Advantage, 27 HEALTH AFF. w156, w160 (2008).
61. Guram & Moffit, supra note 52, at 1178.
62. See Austin Frakt, Medicare Advantage Competitive Bidding: The Political Failure of a
Good Idea, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (April 12, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/
2010/April/041210Frakt.aspx (speculating that removal may have been necessary to satisfy
members of the House of Representatives who had endorsed administered pricing or were
effectively lobbied by insurance industry representatives, or to accommodate the need for a
more certain, favorable score for the ACA from the Congressional Budget Office).
63. See SUSAN JAFFE, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN MEDICARE
ADVANTAGE: IF HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES SUBMITTED COMPETITIVE BIDS TO OFFER MEDICARE
COVERAGE, PRESIDENT OBAMA SAYS THE GOVERNMENT COULD SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 2
(2009), available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php? brief_id=3.
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and their bids.64 Estimated potential savings from these proposals over the
then-existing methodology were significant. The CBO assessment of the
proposed Policy Option issued by the Office of Management and Budget
estimated that it would save over $175 billion over ten years.65 Initial bids in
the Denver pilot test before Congressional action forced it to be abandoned
were 25-38% below prevailing payment rates in the area.66
Thus, the lessons of the flawed competitive mechanisms employed for
MA are mixed. On the positive side, recent evidence demonstrates that MA
plans have proved successful at delivering integrated care below FFS costs
with equal or better quality measures.67 Further, the literature suggests that,
on average, HMOs are slightly more efficient, with some promising
differences in their ability to innovate in delivering services to beneficiaries
with chronic conditions, avoid readmissions, and deal with other cost drivers
familiar in FFS Medicare.68 As to quality of care under MA plans, a recent
survey of the literature finds “promising results” from industry-sponsored
studies, but in general no dramatic differences between MA plans and
FFS.69 On the other hand, the administrative and political supervision of MA
has been characterized by considerable inconsistency. Confusion over the
multiple goals of MA — providing additional benefits to enrollees, reducing
government spending, introducing competitive incentives, leveling the
playing field — has generated a roller coaster ride of changing regulations
and incentives for health plans and beneficiaries.70 HMOs have
demonstrated that they can deliver cost effective care in the commercial
sector and have had modest success in some regions in doing so under MA.
As the national health insurance market consolidates and citizens become
accustomed to coverage by plans, presumably many of which will also
participate in MA, it seems likely that a market for seamless transition into
Medicare managed care will develop.

64. Id. at 1.
65. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS VOL. I HEALTH CARE 122 (2008), available
at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-healthop
tions.pdf; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, A NEW ERA OF RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING
AMERICA’S PROMISE 28 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
omb/assets/fy2010_new_era/A_New_Era_of_Responsibility2.pdf.
66. Guest Post by Bryan Dowd, A Reply to Peter Orszag on Competitive Pricing in
Medicare, NATIONAL REVIEW (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nationalreview.com/agenda/314
704/guest-post-bryan-dowd-reply-peter-orszag-competitive-pricing-medicare-reihan-salam.
67. Landon et al., supra note 42, at 2613.
68. See Gold, supra note 43, at 1175; Guram & Moffit, supra note 52, at 1178-79.
69. Gold, supra note 43, at 1175.
70. See Berenson & Dowd, supra note 38, at w30-w33.
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V. REAL REFORM: MAKING MEDICARE ADVANTAGE WORK AND TRADITIONAL
MEDICARE VIABLE
The vacuous debate during the 2012 Presidential campaign over the
premium support proposal left many voters with the misimpression that they
were choosing between market competition and regulation as remedies for
the Medicare cost problem. In reality, a flurry of regulation is well underway
pursuant to the ACA. But that regulation is aimed at systemic change that
could allow both FFS Medicare and MA or other market-based
arrangements to flourish. These changes are squarely aimed at correcting
the flaws of FFS Medicare payment policy and encouraging delivery system
change that will support competitive markets for alternative methods of
payment including, MA.71 Indeed, what is commonly overlooked is that FFS
Medicare and MA (as well as new payment arrangements such as the
Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP)) all require change in the way
healthcare is organized and delivered to produce cost-effective, quality care.
The ACA has initiated a large number of reforms in Medicare payment
policies that aim to sharply refocus provider incentives and to encourage a
fundamental reorganization of delivery of care. Some, like the MSSP, which
encourages development of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs),
medical homes and financing changes such as bundled payments for
certain diseases, are designed to deploy new payment incentives that will
encourage the growth of seamless, efficient delivery systems.72 Others, such
as changed payment policies for hospital readmissions, value based
purchasing, and comparative effectiveness research, directly tackle flaws in
the FFS system. If nothing else, this amalgam of pilots, experiments, and
permanent programmatic reforms positions the government to rationalize
Medicare based on evidence and experience.73 Perhaps the most intriguing
possibility is that the MSSP will ease the transition from FFS payment to a
market-based platform. The ACO concept, which rewards providers for

71. See Thomas L. Greaney, The Affordable Care Act and Competition Policy: Antidote or
Placebo?, 89 OR L. REV. 811, 825-36 (2011) (discussing the elements of the ACA that advance
competition at the provider and payer levels).
72. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM; SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 197-222
(2012) (summarizing ACA’s changes to Medicare); PATRICIA A. DAVIS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R41196, MEDICARE PROVISIONS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:
SUMMARY AND TIMELINE 26-27 (2011).
73. See Henry J. Aaron & Austin B. Frakt, Why Now is Not the Time for Premium Support,
366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 877 (2012) (explaining that multiple reforms to Medicare enacted
under the ACA will provide information needed to assess whether premium support or other
reforms are needed); see also KAREN DAVIS, supra note 9, at 20 (citing ACA’s rapid and
systematic testing of innovative models of payment and delivery as reason to maintain
Medicare as a guaranteed benefit program).
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accomplishing savings and delivering high quality care when done through
integrative organizations, is built on a platform that retains FFS payment.74
Some thorny questions remain. Can FFS Medicare coexist alongside MA
and ACOs? In some ways the two approaches are complementary. MA
assures that all beneficiaries receive the same minimum benefits and its
beneficiaries are assured the right to return to traditional Medicare if they
become dissatisfied with their private plans. FFS Medicare may come to look
more like MA as providers join ACOs or otherwise configure themselves to
respond to incentives for bundled payment and other reforms. Moreover,
improvements in care processes, information collection, and effectiveness
that may be realized in the competitive sector will have favorable spillover
effects on FFS practices.
At the same time, there are obstacles to realizing this rosy scenario. A
critical issue is whether risk adjustment tools will prove adequate to prevent
efforts to engage in favorable selection that could give MA plans an unfair
advantage and ultimately make traditional Medicare unsustainable.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, excessive cost control can lead to cost
shifting to the private sector. On the other side of the coin, the commercial
market is beset with inefficiencies and MA plans may find it impossible to
offer cost-effective alternatives in markets dominated by monopolistic
hospitals and specialty physician groups. Equally worrisome is the possibility
that some ACOs may develop market power by combining competing
providers in a single bargaining unit.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is fair to interpret the outcome of the 2012 Presidential election as a
vote of confidence in traditional Medicare and rejection of an approach that
would replace it entirely with private plans. Yet, the necessity of controlling
overall spending remains the paramount challenge for ongoing debt
reduction negotiations, and some combination of market-based incentives
and price controls is necessary. In examining the failures of administered
pricing and market competition to control costs thus far, this article has
sought to warn against viewing either as a panacea. The regulatory missteps
that have plagued both approaches provide a cautionary tale for future
reforms. However, the ACA begins to move both in the right direction,

74. See Donald M. Berwick, Launching Accountable Care Organizations – The Proposed
Rule for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2011); Stephen
M. Shortell et al., How the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation Should Test
Accountable Care Organizations, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1293, 1294 (2010). For the view that
ACOs may replace private insurance in the private market, see Ezekiel K. Emanuel & Jeffrey B.
Liebman, The End of Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://opinionator.blogs.
nytimes.com/2012/01/30/the-end-of-health-insurance-companies/.
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perhaps setting in motion changes in provider organizations and in
beneficiary expectations that will permit market forces to assume the pivotal
role in controlling costs.

